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ABSTRACT
DEFAULT EFFECTS IN THE ENDORSEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES
Blake J. Bent 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. Philip Langlais
When making decisions, people are often presented with a default option. Across many 
different domains, individuals show an inflated preference for the default option, a 
phenomenon known as the default effect. The current research examined the default 
effect and the role of loss aversion and implied endorsement in the context of 
environmental policy. Two hundred nineteen undergraduate participants were asked to 
vote on an ostensible ballot question regarding the enactment of seven environmental 
policies. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions based on a 
manipulation of the default option: a default to enact the policy (the opt-out condition), a 
default to not enact the policy (the opt-in condition), and a forced-choice control 
condition. The current study found default effects to be present for three o f the seven 
policies. Of these three policies, participants in the opt-out default condition endorsed 
the policy more often than participants in the opt-in or forced-choice condition. This 
pattern o f results supports the endowment effect (i.e., an extension o f loss aversion) as an 
explanation o f default effects, but an explicit measure o f loss aversion did not. 
Perceptions o f policymaker endorsement did not differ across default conditions and 
political affiliation did not predict voting behavior.
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Climate change and sustainability are growing concerns in the United States and 
around the world. Experts have estimated that the current rate of climate change could 
have devastating effects. Unique ecosystems are being threatened, extreme weather 
events are becoming increasingly likely, and millions o f people could be affected by 
coastal flooding, diminished water supply, and adverse health consequences (Smith et al., 
2009). As a result, many government entities are enacting policies that push its citizens 
to “go green.” According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), environmental 
policy at the state or local level (hereafter labeled green policy) has the ability to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, increase energy security, reduce air pollution, aid economic 
development, and improve overall quality o f life (US EPA, 2012).
The benefits o f green policy, as outlined by the EPA, do not come without costs. 
As with many government-run programs, the expense o f environmental protection and 
conservation are covered by the taxpayer. Funding government-sponsored environmental 
initiatives without cutting other programs requires an increase in taxes. Future savings 
are possible, but not without an initial increase in cost. For example, in 2007 the United 
States government passed the Energy Independence and Security Act which raised the 
efficiency requirements o f light bulbs. Many consumers opted to buy compact 
fluorescent lights (CFLs) which have a higher price tag than the traditional incandescent 
bulbs. The extended lifespan and increased efficiency o f CFLs produce savings over
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time; however, these benefits are still subject to an initial cost (US EPA, 2011). In sum, 
the passing of any green policy is subject to an analysis o f costs and benefits.
Contrary to theories in economics which state that decisions are based on rigid 
analysis o f costs and benefits (such as theories by Leonard Savage as cited in Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979), recent evidence from psychology suggests that a variety o f  situational 
contexts are capable of influencing an individual’s preferences and decisions (for a 
review see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
demonstrated that a preference for a pair o f medical treatments with identical outcomes 
hinged critically on whether the outcomes were worded in terms of lives saved or lives 
lost. In their study o f a hypothetical foreign disease that infected 600 people, two groups 
o f participants were given the following scenarios:
Group 1: Treatment A guarantees that 200 people will be saved. Treatment B has 
a 1/3 probability of saving 600 people and a 2/3 probability o f saving no one. 
Group 2: Treatment C guarantees that 400 people will die. Treatment D has a 1/3 
probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
Treatments A and C, as well as B and D, have equivalent outcomes. However, 
participants in group 1 favored treatment A, while participants in group 2 favored 
treatment D (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Expected utility theory, which is based only 
on costs, benefits, and probabilities, was not able to account for reversal o f preferences 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment is just one o f many
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examples o f how decisions are influenced by more than a mathematical cost-benefit 
analysis (for other examples see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Evidence from the field o f neuroscience also supports the view that individuals do 
not make decisions solely based on hard and fast calculations. For example, in a review 
of the moral judgment literature, Greene and Haidt (2002) found that moral decisions are 
largely driven by emotions. Additionally, emotional centers o f the brain can impact 
decision making, even when these decisions are largely economic in nature. Damasio 
(1996) suggested that emotional events (somatic markers) work in concert with explicit 
cognition to inform decision making. This hypothesis still drives many of the theories 
about the roles o f emotions in decision making (Reimann & Bechara, 2010).
Understanding how humans construct their preferences and make decisions can 
significantly alter the future o f the environment. According to a recent report by the 
California Council on Science and Technology (2011), by 2050 California could achieve 
emissions rates that are 60 percent below the levels from 1990 by using technology that is 
currently available. Although this estimate is unique to California, technological 
innovations are not sufficient for changing the environment. Human decision making is 
ultimately responsible for implementation o f these innovations. The current study 
examined how one aspect of constructed preferences, default effects, impacted 
endorsement o f environmental policies.
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CHAPTER II 
EXPLANATIONS OF DEFAULT EFFECTS 
STATUS QUO BIAS
Individuals have been shown to have an inflated preference for the status quo 
(Anderson, 2003). Under certain circumstances a preference for the status quo is 
beneficial. For example, an individual may genuinely prefer the status quo or deviations 
from the status quo may require high transaction costs (Anderson, 2003). In these cases, 
a preference for the status quo is a perfectly rational behavior. However, individuals 
often select the status quo even when this is a suboptimal decision (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). For example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) studied the health 
plans o f Harvard professors in the 1980s. The professors were able to switch healthcare 
plans yearly at minimal cost. An overwhelming number o f professors, however, 
continued with the same plan year after year. This alone does not necessarily reflect a 
bias, but the authors compared the choices o f long-term enrollees to the selections made 
by new enrollees. New enrollees are presumably free from a status quo bias having not 
previously selected a plan. Therefore, the new enrollees served as a control group to 
gauge an objective level o f preference from year to year. In the early portion o f the 
decade, Blue Cross Blue Shield was heavily favored by the majority o f  professors. 
However, as the years progressed and other plans were added, the balance began to shift 
towards different healthcare plans. The change in selection resulted mostly from new 
enrollees; current professors rarely switched to new plans. Assuming that the new 
enrollees provided an objective evaluation o f the healthcare plans, and after controlling
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for the age of the participants, a status quo bias still persisted in the face o f suboptimal 
choices (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).
DEFAULT EFFECTS AND THE OMISSION BIAS
When individuals are presented with a set o f choices, the decision maker 
commonly has the option to take no action. In many non-trivial decisions, individuals 
prefer to take no action. This effect has been labeled an omission bias (Spranca, Minsk,
& Baron, 1991). Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991) found that omissions were viewed as 
more morally justifiable compared to commissions (actions). Initially, the status quo bias 
and omission bias were thought to be confounded (Ritov & Baron, 1992), and in many 
cases these biases do act in conjunction with one another; taking no action (i.e., the 
omission bias) will lead to no change in the current state o f affairs (i.e., the status quo). 
However, these biases have been shown to be distinct from one another (Schweitzer,
1994). For example, if changes are imminent then taking no action will lead to a new 
state (i.e., deviation from the status quo).
A preference for no action, often coupled with a preference for the status quo, 
leads many individuals to select the default option. The default is the option that an 
individual will receive if he or she does not explicitly state otherwise. Defaults have 
been shown to have significant impacts on preferences. For example, Johnson, Bellman, 
and Lohse (2002) included a check box at the end of an online survey asking participants 
if they could be contacted about future surveys. The default o f the check box varied. In 
one condition, participants had to check the box if  they wished to be contacted in the 
future; if  they did nothing then they would not be contacted. In the second condition, 
participants had to check the box if  they did not want to be contacted in the future; if  they
did nothing then they would be contacted. The researchers found the level o f future 
participants was largely dependent upon the default option. More participants were 
contacted for future surveys in the second condition where they had to check the box in 
order to not be contacted (Johnson et al., 2002). Psychologists refer to this pattern o f 
decisions as a default effect.
The selection of the default can a have very meaningful impact. Johnson and 
Goldstein (2003) examined the effect o f defaults on organ donation both in the United 
States and Europe. In the United States, a large discrepancy was observed between the 
approval rating o f organ donation and the actual percentage o f Americans who are organ 
donors. The authors hypothesized that this difference was due to the fact that in the 
United States donors must explicitly indicate their desire to be organ donors. That is, the 
default for organ donation is to not be a donor. In an experiment manipulating the 
default, rates o f organ donation were significantly higher when participants had to opt out 
of the organ donation program compared to a condition that had participants opt into the 
program (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). A comparison of actual organ donation rates in 
European countries indicated that countries with opt-out policies had significantly higher 
rates of organ donation than countries with opt-in policies. The discrepancy found in the 
real world data was even stronger than the discrepancy in the experimental manipulation 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Default effects also become evident when decision makers are allowed to make 
multiple selections. For example, Park, Jun, and Maclnnis (2000) instructed participants 
to imagine the purchase of an automobile and indicate which options they would include. 
In this study, the decisions took two forms. Half o f the participants were presented with a
fully loaded car and asked to eliminate the options that they did not prefer. Alternatively, 
other participants were initially presented with a base model and asked to indicate the 
options that they preferred to add on. The default in the first scenario was to include 
every option, while the default in the second scenario was to not include any additional 
options. Participants in the fully-loaded default condition consistently preferred more 
options and paid more money than those in the base model condition (Park et al., 2000).
The effects of defaults in multi-selection decision scenarios extend beyond 
automobile purchases. These effects were observed with other consumer items such as 
computers, treadmills (Park et al., 2000), and pizza (Levin, Schreiber, Lauriola, & Gaeth, 
2002). Additionally, a group of geriatric patients opted for more end-of-life treatments 
when instructed to indicate the treatments they wanted withheld rather than the treatments 
they wanted to be provided (Kressel, Chapman, & Leventhal, 2007).
These results suggest that default effects may have serious implications on how 
the public will vote on environmental policies. Advocates, opposition groups, and 
policymakers need to be aware o f these consequences when selecting defaults. When it 
comes to green policy, defaults have the ability to promote or inhibit environmentally 
friendly action. Policymakers can use this information to advance or prevent the 
adoption of green policy based on how they construct the available options— a process 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) refer to as “libertarian paternalism.”
Two notable studies have demonstrated the ability o f defaults to impact eco- 
friendly action. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) found that the preference for green 
energy (e.g., solar, wind, hydro, etc.) over “grey” energy (i.e., coal powered) was 
associated with green default options. Data from energy companies in two German cities
indicated that citizens generally opted for the default green energy when other options 
became available. In one instance the default effect persisted in a city where citizens had 
recently displayed opposition to green energy. In the other natural experiment, citizens 
refused to switch energy options, even when alternatives were cheaper and no switching 
costs would be incurred. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) also found default effects in 
two lab studies which compared green and grey defaults. Preferences for green energy 
were consistently higher when green energy, as opposed to grey energy, was the default.
Similarly, an experiment by Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, and Liu (2011) found 
that a preference for incandescent light bulbs or CFLs is largely influenced by the default 
option. Participants were given a backstory about renovations to their home. The critical 
manipulation was that the contractor had either installed incandescent bulbs or CFLs in 
the home. Participants were asked if  they wished for the contractor to replace the bulbs 
free of charge. When CFLs were the default option (i.e., already installed) compared to 
an incandescent bulb default, participants were more likely to choose CFLs.
In order to more fully understand the default effects on green policy, it is 
necessary to examine the factors contributing to these effects. Of the many factors 
identified (Dinner et al., 2011), effort, implied endorsement, and reference dependence 
have received the most attention.
EFFORT
The effort explanation proposes that taking no action requires less cognitive or 
physical energy than taking action (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Deciding on an option 
other than the default may involve a series o f taxing calculations or taking physical action
such as filling out a form or making a phone call. The disproportionate selection of the 
default presumably stems from the fact that default choices are simply easier.
Johnson and Goldstein (2003), who examined the rates of organ donation cited 
above, hypothesized that effort contributed to the disparity between their experimental 
and observational results. Default effects were present in both cases, but the real-world 
data (i.e. the results o f the observational study) showed a stronger divide between organ 
donation rates in opt-in vs. opt-out countries. The physical effort required in the 
experiment was simply to click a computer mouse. However, to actually change your 
organ donation preference in the real world requires filling out paperwork and sending 
mail.
IMPLIED ENDORSEMENT
Implied endorsement posits that decision makers infer that the default condition 
was selected because of its greater value, and that those who set the default are 
recommending this option. The default effect occurs because decision makers rely on 
this recommendation when making a choice. Implied endorsement is thought to be 
especially important in socially charged decisions (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 
2006).
McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein (2006) systematically examined the implied 
endorsement hypothesis in a series o f experiments. In Experiment 1, the authors 
instructed participants to act as state officials and select a default policy for organ 
donation. Participants chose between two policies where the default was either being an 
organ donor or not being an organ donor. The resulting policy selections were found to 
be related to the participants’ willingness to be an organ donor as well as their general
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attitudes towards organ donation. Those who indicated that they were willing to be an 
organ donor were significantly more likely to set organ donation as the default policy 
than those who indicated that they were not willing to be an organ donor. Additionally, 
participants who thought that other people ought to be organ donors were more likely to 
set organ donation as the default policy compared to participants who thought other 
people should not be organ donors (McKenzie et al., 2006).
Experiment 2 examined what participants inferred about policymakers based on 
the default organ donation policy. Participants were more likely to infer that 
policymakers were willing to be organ donors when the default policy was “organ donor” 
compared to “not an organ donor.” Also, those in the “organ donor” default condition 
were more likely to infer that policymakers believed other people ought to be organ 
donors compared to those in the “not a donor” default condition. (McKenzie et al., 2006). 
Together, these studies indicate that policymakers’ preferences may their selection o f a 
default (Experiment 1) and that other people actively make inferences about these 
preferences (Experiment 2).
Additional evidence has come from consumer research. Brown and Krishna 
(2004) presented participants with products that came with three customizable categories, 
e.g., a computer with different available keyboards, monitors, and hard drives. Each 
product category had two options, high quality and high price versus low quality and low 
price. The experimenters manipulated which o f these options was set as the default (high 
or low) as well as the amount o f information that the participants received about the 
seller. In the limited information condition, participants were provided with a simple 
description of the retailer. In addition to the retailer description, participants in the
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enhanced information condition read a paragraph indicating that the seller was a 
reputable organization yet was in jeopardy of going out of business.
Compared to a forced-choice control condition (participants chose a product 
option but no default was identified) participants in the high default condition chose the 
more expensive option more often. However, in the enhanced information condition, this 
effect was not present. The researchers reasoned that the default option influenced 
choices by providing information about the marketer. Specifically, when the retailer was 
threatened with going out of business, the consumers were motivated to generate reasons 
why the marketer might be setting the default as the more expensive option (Brown & 
Krishna, 2004). There is no explicit evidence that the participants in the limited 
information condition used the default option as an unbiased recommendation. However, 
the results in the enhanced information condition do indicate that defaults have the ability 
to carry information about those who set them.
REFERENCE DEPENDENCE
The reference dependence explanation o f default effects draws from prospect 
theory, which hinges on the notion that gains and losses are not viewed in absolute terms, 
but rather as deviations from a reference point. Additionally, the value function for gains 
and losses are not equivalent (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the value function for losses is steeper than it is for gains. 
This discrepancy is due to a human tendency towards loss aversion: people see more 
negativity in a loss o f x  value than they see positivity in a gain of x  value. Initial 




Figure 1. A theoretical value function according to prospect theory.
series of gambles. Decision makers consistently opted to take risks to avoid a loss, but 
were unwilling to take equivalent risks to enhance a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Loss aversion explains default effects by assuming the default to be the reference 
point. Any option other than the default is evaluated in terms of losses or gains. 
Deviations from the default can have both positive and negative effects, but because 
losses are weighted more heavily than gains, the positive deviations are generally voided 
by negative deviations. A related line o f research on consumer behavior has suggested an 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) that refers to an imbalance between money that people 
are willing to pay (WTP) for a product and the amount that people are willing to accept 
(WTA) to sell a product (WTA > WTP). For example, in an experiment by Knetsch 
(1989), participants were initially given two candy bars or two dollars. Participants 
endowed with the candy bars were asked the minimum dollar amount they would accept 
to sell their candy. Likewise, participants endowed with the money were asked how 
much money they were willing to pay for the candy bars. The average value given to the
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candy bars by those endowed with them was much higher (M  = $ 1.38) than those 
endowed with money (M = $0.90). Similar to default effects, loss aversion is able to 
explain this preference for an initial endowment. The thought of giving up an item drives 
up its perceived value (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).
An extension of these ideas is that people generally focus on what they are giving 
up. In the context o f purchasing tickets to a basketball game, Carmon and Ariely (2000) 
showed that sellers generally assessed value based on what they would be surrendering 
by selling the ticket (e.g., the importance of the game). Conversely, buyers traditionally 
are surrendering money in a transaction, so their focus was based on monetary concerns. 
Not only did the two groups display dissimilar attitudes towards value assessment, but 
manipulating aspects o f the transaction affected the two groups differently. Changes in 
monetary conditions (e.g., the sticker price o f a ticket) had stronger effects on buyers than 
sellers; changes in items conditions (e.g., the atmosphere o f the crowd at the game) had a 
stronger effect on sellers than buyers.
Reference dependence and its byproducts o f loss aversion and the endowment 
effect have been displayed in previous research on green defaults. Dinner et al. (2011) 
found that reference dependence was a key contributor to the selection o f incandescent 
bulbs or CFLs. Furthermore, Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) found that participants 
required much more money to give up green energy than participants were willing to pay 
for green energy. This willingness to pay/willingness to accept discrepancy supports the 
endowment effect. However, when asked to explicitly state the reasons for their 
decisions (e.g., cost, environmental impact, etc.), no differences were found between 
conditions.
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Each of the preceding mechanisms (effort, implied endorsement, and reference 
dependence) is capable o f producing default effects and there is no evidence to suggest 
that they are mutually exclusive. The default option may require less effort, be perceived 
as highly recommended, and focus individuals on losses rather than gains. The more 
likely scenario, however, is that some of these mechanisms are more prevalent than 
others depending on the context. In order to understand how default effects operate in the 
evaluation of green policy, the impact o f each of these mechanisms must be measured.
The current study looked at default effects in green policy, the nature o f how they 
operate, and their impact on potential voters’ preferences. Past research has studied the 
effect o f defaults on environmentally friendly behavior (Dinner et al., 2011; Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008), but the current study adds to the current literature in three ways. 
First, this experiment is not based on tangible and immediate outcomes, but instead on 
policies with future impact. For example, rather than investigating how a house’s current 
light bulb affects a preference for incandescent or CFL bulbs (Dinner et al., 2011), the 
current study examined how defaults potentially impact the preference for a light bulb 
efficiency mandate. Additionally, past research has often been limited to dichotomous 
choices (e.g., incandescent vs. CFL), but the current study measured the default effects in 
multi-faceted decisions (i.e., the decision makers are able to make multiple selections). 
This form of default research has been limited to the domain of consumer behavior 
(Levin et al., 2002; Park et al., 2000), but the current study extends the multi-choice 
paradigm to environmental decision making. Finally, the current study explored the 
impact of environmental loss versus monetary loss to see which o f these factors has a 




The current study asked participants to indicate their preferences for a series o f 
green policies and their associated costs. The critical manipulation is the nature o f the 
default. In one condition, the participants were presented with an array o f policies and 
asked to indicate which programs they want to be enacted (the opt-in condition). 
Participants in the other condition were presented with the same set o f policies but told to 
indicate which policies they do not wish to be enacted (the opt-out condition). A control 
condition did not have a default. Participants in the control condition were asked to 
indicate their preference to either enact or eliminate each presented policy (forced- 
choice).
These differences in defaults are predicted to lead to differential preferences in the 
number of endorsed green policies. Specifically, participants in the opt-out condition are 
willing to endorse more policies (and thus spend more of their tax dollars) than 
participants in the opt-in condition. Reference dependence is expected to be the key 
contributor to this explanation. Because o f the nature o f the task, physical effort, as 
described by Johnson and Goldstein (2003), was not measured. The current experiment 
does not offer a meaningful comparison group, so measuring effort would not lead to any 
substantial conclusions. Implied endorsement (McKenzie et al., 2006) is expected to 
differ across conditions. Policymakers in the opt-out condition will be seen as favoring 
green policies more than those in the opt-in condition. This difference is expected to be 
small, however, because in both conditions the policymakers are presenting voters with
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green initiatives. In other words, even though the opt-in condition has a default o f no 
action, legislators would have to be involved for the policies to make it to a ballot. 
Therefore, differences in implied endorsement are expected to explain minimal amounts 
o f variance in the number of preferred green policies.
For reference dependence to adequately explain default effects in green policy, 
participants must be focused on the losses in each condition. According to Carmon and 
Ariely (2000), loss aversion leads to a “focus on the forgone.” The forgone aspect in the 
opt-out condition is environmental benefits while the forgone in the opt-in condition is 
money. Therefore, the loss of environmental benefits should have a greater influence on 
participants in the opt-out condition compared to the opt-in condition. Alternatively, 
those in the opt-in condition are predicted to be more influenced by monetary losses than 
those in the opt-out condition. In sum, the proposed study makes the following 
predictions:
Hi: Participants in the opt-out condition will vote for more environmental 
programs, and thus be willing to spend more in taxes, than participants in the opt- 
in condition.
H2 : Participants in the opt-out condition will perceive the policy makers as more 
strongly endorsing green initiatives than participants in the opt-in condition.
H3 : Participants in the opt-out condition will report a stronger influence of 
environmental effects on their decisions compared to participants in the opt-in 
condition. Participants in the opt-in condition report a stronger influence of the 
monetary cost on their decisions compared to participants in the opt-out condition.
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HU: The effects o f loss aversion, as measured by the reported influence of 
monetary and environmental concern, will explain more variance among 
conditions than implied endorsement.
Each o f these hypotheses comes with a caveat. In matters o f green policy, one 
important factor that cannot be overlooked is political affiliation. Although default 
effects have been found to be robust across multiple experimental and observational 
areas, the effects can be diminished when the decision maker has particularly strong 
emotions towards the domain (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Previous research found 
that Democrats are more willing than Republicans to support green policy (Aldy,
Kotchen, & Leiserowitz, 2012; O’Connor, Bord, Yamal, & Wiefek, 2002). Additionally, 
Republicans and Independents have been shown to be less willing to support green policy 
when the expenditures are labeled as “taxes” (the methodology used for the current 
study) as opposed to “offset” (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010). Due to these findings, 
political party affiliation is expected to interact with the default effects. Participants were 





The final sample consisted o f 219 undergraduate students (58.40% female) who 
completed the experimental task in exchange for research credit. All eligible students 
also had the opportunity to complete similar tasks for equivalent credit. Each participant 
was issued a unique identification number by the Department of Psychology in order to 
administer research credit. These numbers were recorded by the experimenter but were 
not linked to individual data. Because responses remained anonymous, a review 
committee in the College o f Sciences classified the study as exempt. The mean age o f 
participants was 20.68 years (SD  = 5.04); ten participants did not report their age.
Among all participants, 94 were Democrats, 51 were Republican, and 74 did not affiliate 
with either party. Participants’ responses remained anonymous although 
MEASURES
Implied endorsement. Implied endorsement was measured with an item adapted 
from McKenzie et al. (2006). Participants indicated their level of agreement using a 7 
point scale from -3 (completely disagree) to 3 (completely agree) with the following 
statement: I voted for the policies that I did because I felt like the policymakers wanted 
me to select these options. In previous studies this item was able to detect significant 
differences in implied endorsement across default conditions (McKenzie et al., 2006; 
Dinner et al., 2011)
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Reference dependence. In order to assess reference dependence, the current 
study employed methods consistent with the account o f loss aversion endorsed by 
Carmon and Ariely (2000). Participants were asked to indicate how much their responses 
were driven by both monetary and environmental concerns. Specifically, participants 
were asked how much of their decision was influenced by the environmental benefits of 
the policy and the cost o f the policy. Participants indicated their responses by dragging 
sliders on scales from 0  to 1 0 0  to indicate the influence of the environmental benefits and 
costs independently.
Political affiliation. The measure o f political affiliation followed from Hardisty 
et al. (2009) by asking participants to indicate if  they identify as Democrat, Republican, 
or none o f  the above.
Ballot question. Preferences for green policy were assessed by participants’ 
“votes” on an ostensible Virginia state ballot questionnaire. The questionnaire contained 
a series of environmental policies and their associated annual costs to the citizens. 
Participants were instructed to check a box if they were in favor o f passing the policy. 
Three versions of the questionnaire were presented which represented three levels o f  the 
primary independent variable (i.e., opt-in, opt-out, and forced-choice). One group o f 
participants saw an empty checkbox next to the policy. Another group saw the checkbox 
already checked. Finally, the control group was presented with a forced-choice ballot. 
That is, these participants were instructed to indicate a yes or a no for each policy.
The Virginia state ballot questionnaire was developed through an online search 
for environmental policies that are either implemented or under consideration in 
municipalities across the United States. This search generated a list o f seven potential
environmental policies. In many cases, policies included actual or estimated costs to 
taxpayers. For some policies, a “ballpark” cost was generated by the investigator using 
per capita cost estimates. For example, the cost o f  eco-fees was estimated by dividing the 
revenue from eco-fees in British Columbia (where the program is already in place) by the 
population of the province. These policies were then examined by members o f a local 
environmental protection organization. The members o f the environmental protection 
organization independently rated each policy across a number of categories in order to 
validate the measurement instrument. Categories included the following: the policy 
addresses a real environmental issue; the policy could be implemented by a state or local 
government; the policy would have a positive environmental impact; the cost is a 
reasonable “ballpark” estimate; implementation o f the policy will result in an increased 
cost. The subject matter experts showed high levels o f agreement in nearly every 
category for each proposed policy (see Table 1 for complete results). Full descriptions of 









Recycling 4.50 4.17 4.33 3.33 4.17
Green Mileage 4.83 3.50 4.00 3.17 4.83
Lighting 4.33 3.17 3.50 3.50 4.17
Storm Water 5.00 4.83 5.00 3.50 4.50
Compost 4.33 4.17 4.17 2.83 4.33
Carbon Tax 4.50 3.50 3.67 3.33 4.67
Eco-Fees 4.33 2.83 3.33 3.33 4.67
Note. Categories: This policy addresses a real environmental issue; This policy would be 
proposed by a state or local government; This policy will have a positive environmental 
impact; The projected program costs stated in the policy represent a reasonable 
“ballpark” estimate; Implementation o f the policy will result in an increased cost, either 
direct or indirect, to the voter. Ratings were done on a scale o f 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
{strongly agree).
PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted in a single computer-based session. Small groups 
of participants (< 15) independently completed the survey in a campus computer lab.
The measures outlined above were integrated into a single questionnaire using Qualtrics 
survey development software. The first page of the survey was a notification statement 
informing the participants of the general concept o f the study and the rights o f the 
participant. The next page asked for the demographic information o f sex and age. After 
completing the demographic section, participants read instructions asking them to 
imagine that state legislators have placed seven environmental policies on a state ballot
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question. Participants were told that: (1) each o f the policies will result in increased 
taxes, (2 ) the estimated costs will be presented with each o f the policies, and (3 ) policies 
will be enacted if  more than half o f total voters approve the policy. Participants were 
asked to vote as they would in a real situation.
Participants read the description of each policy and had to correctly answer two 
attention-check questions before proceeding to the vote. These questions assessed 
comprehension to assure that the participants had an understanding o f the costs and 
benefits of each policy. Each description was paired with the voting procedure so 
participants voted on each policy and indicated the influence o f monetary cost and 
environmental benefits before moving onto the next policy. The full policy description 
remained available to participants throughout the voting procedure.
After the voting procedure, participants were asked to complete the items 
assessing implied endorsement and political affiliation. Political affiliation was presented 




After data collection was complete, internal consistency o f the ballot question was 
found to be below acceptable levels in each condition (a < .495, average inter-item 
correlation < . 110). These reliability statistics indicated that votes on one policy were not 
related to votes on other policies and using a composite score of total endorsed policies 
was not appropriate. Therefore, each policy was analyzed independently using a logistic 
regression model. The alpha level for all significance tests was set to .05.
Individual completion times were recorded in order to estimate participants’ 
adherence to the task instructions and to check for outliers. The total number o f words in 
the entire instrument was calculated. Because some instructions were repeated, these 
words were not included in the word count. Carver (1992) reported that college students 
read at an approximate rate of 300 words per minute which translates into a minimum 
completion time of 15.5 minutes. Participants who completed the survey in less than 
15.5 minutes were excluded from analysis. These 41 participants were reasoned to not 
have taken enough time to adequately comprehend the policies and survey instructions. 
Further evidence on reading rates suggests that reading on a computer is slower than 
reading on paper (Ziefle, 1998), but the 300 word per minute rate maintained a 
conservative approach to data cleaning. O f the remaining 227 participants, eight had 
completion times that were more than three standard deviations from the mean; therefore, 
219 participants were included the final analysis.
Figure 2 displays the proportion o f participants in each condition who voted for 
each policy. Logistic regression analysis was performed to test for default effects (see 
Table 2). Logistic regression models displayed significant X values for the green 
mileage, compost, and carbon tax policies. Default conditions were dummy-coded with 
the forced-choice condition as the reference group. Only the opt-out condition was 
significantly different from the forced-choice condition for both the green mileage and 
compost policies. No individual predictors were significant when analyzing the carbon 
tax policy. These results demonstrated that when a default effect is present the opt-out 
condition is driving the effect. The opt-in condition did not significantly change 




















Figure 2. Proportion of respondents in each default condition who voted for each policy. 




Policy_____________ X?__________ Wald________ Odds Ratio 95% Cl for Odds
Ratio
Recycling 4.90
Opt-out 1.58 1.99 [0.68, 5.81]
Opt-in 0.76 0.68 [0.29, 1.62]
Green Mileage 9.31*
Opt-out 5.83* 2.35 [1.17, 4.70]
Opt-in 0.05 0.92 [0.45, 1.90]
Lighting 1.60
Opt-out 0.25 0.83 [0.41, 1.70]
Opt-in 1.54 0.65 [0.32, 1.29]
Storm Water 0.16
Opt-out 0.04 0.96 [0.48, 1.93]
Opt-in 0.15 0.87 [0.44, 1.74]
Compost 12.25**
Opt-out 10.01* * 5.46 [1.91, 15.64]
Opt-in 3.52 2.18 [0.97, 4.91]
Carbon Tax 8.05*
Opt-out 1.69 0.19 [0.78, 3.38]
Opt-in 2.07 0.61 [0.31, 1.20]
Eco-Fee 1.40
Opt-out 1.38 1.74 [0.69, 4.38]
ODt-in 0.41 0.52 ro.56. 3.141
Note. * p < . 05; * * p < .  01
All other predictors (i.e., importance of environmental and monetary
considerations, implied policymaker endorsement and political affiliation) did not 
demonstrate their expected effects. A univariate analysis o f  variance (ANOVA) was 
employed to assess significant differences in the influence o f  cost and environmental 
benefits across conditions. For both analyses, the residuals approached normality. 
Levene’s test indicated homogeneity o f  variance for both cost, F(2, 216) = 0.28, p  = .755, 
and environmental benefit, F(2, 216) = 032 , p  = .728. No significant differences were
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observed on the reported importance o f environmental benefits, F(2, 216) = 0.04, p  =
.960, rj2< .001, or cost, F(2, 216) = 1.88,p = .155, r\2 = .017 (see Table 2).
Table 3
ANOVA Results for the Influence o f  Cost and Environmental Benefits
SS df MS F
Cost









Condition 1043.40 2 521.70 0.04
Error 2733945.92 216 12657.16
Total 2734989.32 218
Across all conditions, participants rated the environmental benefits as more 
influential than the monetary costs /(218) = 7.76, p  < .001, d -  .730. The environmental 
benefits were more influential for every policy except green mileage (see Table 4). 











M( S D )
Recycling
Cost 51.6 (27.1) 48.1 (27.0) 52.8 (24.0)
Benefit 74.6 (21.6) 77.1 (19.2) 75.2 (20.8)
Green Mileage
Cost 63.1 (26.6) 60.5 (30.7) 63.1 (26.6)
Benefit 56.5 (25.5) 51.5 (26.5) 60.4 (26.4)
Lighting
Cost 56.5 (24.7) 50.9 (26.7) 59.1 (25.7)
Benefit 6 6 . 0  (26.8) 66.5 (26.7) 63.5 (24.8)
Storm Water
Cost 59.2 (24.8) 56.4 (26.7) 57.7 (26.2)
Benefit 66.0 (23.9) 66.5 (22.4) 61.2 (24.9)
Compost
Cost 52.3 (25.8) 50.3 (27.7) 55.9 (24.6)
Benefit 76.3 (21.2) 72.5 (20.7) 73.7(17.7)
Carbon Tax
Cost 59.2 (27.3) 51.6 (29.4) 56.3 (26.9)
Benefit 62.7 (26.2) 65.5 (25.9) 65.4 (24.1)
Eco-Fee
Cost 54.9 (27.5) 46.2 (27.4) 51.4 (28.5)
Benefit 74.9 (22.0) 72.6 (25.0) 73.6 (21.7)
Total
Cost 56.7 (16.7) 52.0(18.8) 57.3 (17.0)
Benefit 68.2 05.7) 67.4 05 .7 ) 67.6 116.8)
ANOVA was used to assess differences in perceived policymaker endorsement. 
Residuals approached normality and Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of 
homogeneity o f variance was met, F(2, 216) = 0.62, p  = .541. Participants in each 
default condition perceived roughly the same endorsement from the policymakers, F(2, 
216) = 0.03, p  = .970, T]2 < .001. Also, political affiliation did not predict votes for any 
policy ( p ’s>  .05) using logistic regression analysis. Because neither the measures o f
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reference dependence nor implied endorsement differed across conditions, Hypothesis 4 





The decision making literature has indicated default effects to be a robust 
phenomenon and the results o f the current study partially support their existence in the 
context o f environmental policies (Hypothesis 1). When voting for a policy that would 
tax individuals based on energy usage, the default option was a significant predictor o f 
the participant’s response. Additionally, participants were more likely to vote in favor of 
a green mileage and compost policy when the default vote was in favor o f the policy 
rather than not in favor o f the policy. Votes for policies regarding a recycling program, 
energy efficient lighting standards, improved storm water systems, and eco-fees were 
unaffected by the default option.
One possible explanation for why only three policies displayed default effects is 
that participants were unfamiliar with these three policies. The communities surrounding 
the university where the research was conducted have municipal recycling programs, 
charge a fee for the upkeep of storm water systems, and some local industries apply eco- 
fees (e.g., tire dealers charge a fee for the proper disposal o f  old tires). Currently these 
communities do not have any policies in place regarding a carbon tax, green mileage fee, 
or compost program. Previous research has reported that the selection o f the default 
option increases as outcome uncertainty increases (see Anderson, 2003 for a review).
This principle could explain why default effects were only present for unfamiliar policies. 
If participants were unfamiliar with the carbon tax, green mileage, and compost program
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policies then one could assume that the participants were uncertain o f the policy 
outcomes. This uncertainty might have led to the selection o f the default option. 
Alternatively, the familiar policies could be associated with familiar outcomes.
Therefore, participants would be more willing to deviate from the default option when 
voting for these policies. Future studies should measure familiarity/certainty in order to 
verify this explanation.
OPT-IN VERSUS OPT-OUT
O f the three policies which demonstrated statistically significant default effects, 
only the opt-out default condition was significantly different from the forced-choice 
condition. This finding supports an endowment account o f default effects. One outcome 
of the endowment effect is that individuals require more money to sell a good in their 
possession than they would pay to purchase the same good. In terms o f the current study, 
participants would need more money to give up the environmental benefits o f a policy 
than others would be willing to pay in order to pass the policy. The opt-out condition is 
different than the opt-in and forced-choice conditions in one important way. Doing 
nothing alters the status quo in the opt-out condition but not in the other two. Participants 
are not already in “possession” o f the environmental benefits in the opt-in and forced- 
choice conditions. Therefore, participants in both of these conditions must ask how much 
they are willing to pay for the environmental benefits. Because WTP < WTA, 
participants in the opt-in and forced-choice conditions were less likely to endorse the 
policy than participants in the opt-out condition. This result is supported by the reference 
dependence account o f the default effect. The endowment effect is a byproduct o f 
reference dependence which provides partial support for Hypothesis 3. This endowment
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account of default effects aligns with the findings o f Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) 
who found that participants required more money to relinquish environmental benefits 
than they were willing to pay for those same benefits. Previous research on reference 
dependence and green defaults has focused on consumer products with tangible outcomes 
(Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Dinner et al., 2011). One distinguishing component of 
the current study is that the default effect is examined at the policy level. The findings 
from this experiment indicate that policy decisions may be susceptible to the same 
influences as consumer decision making.
COST VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
As stated above, the observed pattern o f default effects supports the endowment 
effect but the explicit measures o f cost and environmental influence do not. Participants 
did not report differences in the influence o f cost or environmental benefits across 
conditions. Hypothesis 3, which stated that the influence of the monetary costs and 
environmental benefits would differ across conditions, was not supported by this 
measure.
The lack of support for Hypothesis 3 has multiple possible explanations. On 
average, participants rated the environmental benefits as more influential in their decision 
making process than the cost associated with each policy. The green mileage policy was 
the only individual policy in which participants across conditions rated the cost as more 
influential them the environmental benefits. The green mileage policy was also the most 
expensive and was endorsed by the fewest participants. Figure 2 shows that the green 
mileage policy did not gamer a majority o f votes in any condition (the opt-out default
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condition was split exactly at 50%)— the only policy to do so. Cost appeared to have a 
negative effect on policy endorsement across all conditions.
Participants were specifically instructed to indicate how important the cost was to 
their decision, not just their opinion o f the policy’s value. These results show that 
participants only considered cost to be more influential than environmental benefits when 
cost was high. When costs were low participants were more focused on the 
environmental benefits. Perhaps costs are negligible when they are below a specific 
threshold. Interestingly, Aldy, Kotchen, and Leiserowitz (2012) found that the average 
American is willing to pay $162 per year in higher electricity bills to help the 
environment. The green mileage policy was the only policy with an estimated annual 
cost greater than $162.
Another possible explanation for the relative unimportance o f policies’ monetary 
cost is delay discounting. Delay or hyperbolic discounting states that individuals 
generally prefer immediate gains and delayed losses (Thaler, 1981). Stating annual costs 
instead of immediate costs might have given the impression that participants would not 
suffer any financial loss until sometime in the future. Delaying payment would thereby 
lessen the impact o f the cost.
IMPLIED ENDORSEMENT
Participants did not perceive different levels o f policymaker endorsement across 
conditions; Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The fact that participants did not differ in 
their levels o f policymaker endorsement was not expected, although this effect was 
expected to be smaller than the reference dependence explanation. The proposed policies 
had already made it to a ballot so participants may have felt that policymakers in each
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condition supported the policies by putting them to a vote. Additionally, the default 
option may have been seen as a part o f the ballot system and unrelated to the wishes o f 
the policymakers. Moreover, previous research on implied endorsement has asked 
participants to explicitly consider the consequences of the default option. While 
individuals have shown that they perceive recommendations in default options 
(McKenzie et al., 2006), no evidence suggests that these recommendations lead to a 
preference for that option. This study suggests that, at least on an explicit level, implied 
policymaker endorsement has no effect on preferences for environmental policies. 
LIM ITATIONS
Given the nature o f the experimental task, the use o f a student sample likely 
affected the results and limited the study’s generalizability. The current study depended 
on an ostensible voting scenario. A large proportion o f the participants were 18 years old 
when the data was collected in the summer and fall o f 2013. Many o f these students may 
have never participated in an election. Furthermore, the youth of the participants may 
have limited their understanding of the financial consequences presented in each 
scenario. For example, if the students were not familiar with paying storm water fees in 
the past then the implications o f a fee increase may not have been fully understood. 
Additionally, the task may have been too artificial for participants to actually appreciate 
the effect of the losses. Voting for a policy in a lab is much different from a true scenario 
in which real money is involved.
The policies in the current study were meant to reflect a high level o f external 
validity. Each policy was based on realistic estimates o f costs and benefits while 
sacrificing internal validity. The heterogeneous costs and benefits among policies may
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have added too much unexplained variability to the outcomes, thereby obscuring 
statistical significance.
Finally, measuring the role o f loss aversion in default effects relied on explicit 
measures (i.e., participants were directly asked how the cost and environmental impacts 
influenced their decisions). Upon review, these items could be susceptible to a social 
desirability bias. Participants may have wanted to be viewed as charitable or generous 
which would explain the greater reported influence of environmental impacts compared 
to costs. Given the subject matter, this effect may have especially prevalent. Research 
has shown that people are more likely to buy green products in public and that “going 
green” can be motivated by social status and reputation (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den 
Bergh, 2010). Having small groups o f peers complete the survey at the same time may 
have exacerbated the desire to be environmentally conscious. Future research should 
incorporate less obvious items often used in the study o f the endowment effect.
Measures o f willingness to pay and willingness to accept (Carmon & Ariely, 2000;
Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) may produce a more genuine measure o f the effect o f 
loss aversion.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The current study focused on one particular aspect o f  constructed preferences—  
default effects. However, many other factors have been shown to elicit economically 
irrational behavior. One particular line o f research relevant to environmental policies is 
intertemporal choice (i.e., decisions with payoffs and losses at different points in time). 
Research has demonstrated that future gains and losses are not evaluated in the same 
manner as immediate gains and losses (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Frederick,
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Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Green & Myerson, 1996; Thaler, 1981). The 
rewards o f environmental policies are almost always distributed across time. For 
example, consumers will not reap immediate rewards by purchasing energy efficient light 
bulbs, but over time the environmental and economic rewards will start to add up. The 
way in which these future costs and benefits are communicated to voters and consumers 
will presumably impact their preferences. Future research should examine how these 
effects alter preferences.
The finding that default effects differed among policies is another avenue for 
future research. Although a link between familiarity and certainty o f environmental 
policy costs and benefits was presented here, this connection is in need o f further 
investigation. Additionally, the current experiment tried to reflect a reasonable estimate 
o f externally valid policies. Using such diverse policies has created a challenge of 
finding an underlying factor structure. Future research should aim to identify the factors 
o f each policy and how those factors influence the decision making process. The current 
study tried to isolate two broad categories of cost and environmental benefits, but a more 
finely tuned approach is needed.
Along with identifying underlying differences among policies, an alternate line of 
research would attempt to identify individual differences among voters. Socioeconomic 
status, for example, may be associated with voting behaviors. The participants in the 
current study were all college students so the impact and immediacy o f these policies 
may be perceived differently relative to individuals with different economic or 
educational backgrounds.
Although the influence o f monetary and environmental factors did not display the 
expected effect in the current study, future research should examine how these two 
factors interact. Implementing a willingness to pay versus willingness to accept 
paradigm, as mentioned above, will help determine the relative value o f each factor on 
voter behavior. Specifically, these studies would help policymakers determine how much 
voters are willing to pay for differing degrees of environmental protection/benefit.
Finally, the political affiliation o f policymakers should be investigated. The 
current study did not find a perceived difference in implied policymaker endorsement, 
but the boundaries o f implied endorsement should be further examined. Perhaps making 
traits o f policymakers more salient to voters will have a greater influence on how voters 
make their decision. Brown and Krishna (2004) predicted a reversal o f default effects 
when consumers are given knowledge about the company who established the default.
By explicitly stating which political party member has determined the default option, the 
opposing party’s voters might purposefully choose against the default option while the 
voters with the same party affiliation may be more apt to adopt the default. This method 
would evoke the participants’ political schema which may be a necessary factor for 




For some environmental policies, voting scenarios which enact the policy by 
default (voters must opt out) led to a higher level o f endorsement than a forced-choice or 
opt-in policy which partially confirmed Hypothesis 1. Explicit measures o f the effects o f 
loss aversion and implied endorsement could not explain the default effect which did not 
support Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, for those policies demonstrating default effects, 
the pattern o f results supported an endowment account (and reference dependence by 
proxy) o f default effects. This endowment effect shows that processes affecting 
consumer behavior may also be driving voting behavior. Future research should examine 
other aspects o f constructed preferences in the context o f  environmental policy as well as 
determining the individual and policy factors which drive voting behavior.
38
REFERENCES
Aldy, J. E., Kotchen, M. J., & Leiserowitz, A. A. (2012). Willingness to pay and political 
support for a US national clean energy standard. Nature Clim. Change, 2(8), 596- 
599. doi: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1527
Anderson, C. J. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: Forms o f decision avoidance 
result from reason and emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 139-166. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.139
Brown, C. L., & Krishna, A. (2004). The skeptical shopper: A metacognitive account for 
the effects o f default options on choice. Journal o f  Consumer Research, 31(3), 
529-539.
California Council on Science and Technology (2011, May). California's energy future:
A view to 2050. Retrieved from http://ccst.us/publications/2011/201 lenergy.pdf
Carmon, Z., & Ariely, D. (2000). Focusing on the forgone: How value can appear so 
different to buyers and sellers. Journal o f  Consumer Research, 27(3), 360-370. 
doi: 10.2307/254292
Carver, R. P. (1992). Reading rate: Theory, research, and practical implications. Journal 
o f  Reading, 36(2), 84-95.
Damasio, A. R. (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions o f the 
prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 351, 1413- 
1420.
Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: 
Why people choose not to choose. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: Applied, 
77(4), 332-341. doi: 10.1037/a0024354 
Estle, S. J., Green, L., Myerson, J., & Holt, D. D. (2006). Differential effects o f amount 
on temporal and probability discounting o f gains and losses. Memory &
Cognition, 34(4), 914-928.
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O ’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time 
preference: A critical review. Journal o f  Economic Literature, XL, 351-401. 
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (1996). Exponential versus hyperbolic discounting of delayed 
outcomes: Risk and waiting time. American Zoologist, 36, 496-505.
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517-523. doi: 10.1016/sl364-6613(02)02011-9 
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010). Going green to be seen: 
Status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation. Journal o f  Personality and 
Social Psychology, 98(3), 392-404. doi: 10.1037/a0017346 
Hardisty, D. J., Johnson, E. J., & Weber, E. U. (2010). A dirty word or a dirty world?
Psychological Science, 27(1), 86-92. doi: 10.1177/0956797609355572 
Johnson, E. J., Bellman, S., & Lohse, G. L. (2002). Defaults, framing and privacy: Why 
opting in J- opting out. Marketing Letters, 73(1), 5-15. doi:
10.1023/a: 1015044207315 
Johnson, E. J., 8c Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338- 
1339. doi: 10.1126/science. 1091721
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The endowment
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. The Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 
5(1), 193-206.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis o f decision under 
risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
Knetsch, J. L. (1989). The endowment effect and evidence o f nonreversible indifference 
curves. The American Economic Review, 79(5), 1277-1284.
Kressel, L., Chapman, G., & Leventhal, E. (2007). The influence o f default options on
the expression of end-of-life treatment preferences in advance directives. Journal 
o f  General Internal Medicine, 22(7), 1007-1010. doi: 10.1007/s11606-007-0204-6
Levin, I. P., Schreiber, J., Lauriola, M., & Gaeth, G. J. (2002). A tale o f two pizzas: 
Building up from a basic product versus scaling down from a fully-loaded 
product. Marketing Letters, 13(4), 335-344. doi: 10.1023/a: 1020370516638
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (Eds.). (2006). The construction o f preference. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
McKenzie, C. R., Liersch, M. J., & Finkelstein, S. R. (2006). Recommendations implicit 
in policy defaults. Psychological Science, 17(5), 414-420. doi: 10.1111/j. 1467- 
9280.2006.01721.x
O'Connor, R. E., Bord, R. J., Yamal, B., & Wiefek, N. (2002). Who wants to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions? Social Science Quarterly, 53(1), 1-17. doi: 
10.1111/1540-6237.00067
Park, C. W., Jun, S. Y., & Maclnnis, D. J. (2000). Choosing what I want versus rejecting 
what I do not want: An application o f decision framing to product option choice 
decisions. Journal o f  Marketing Research, 37(2), 187-202.
Pichert, D., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2008). Green defaults: Information presentation and 
pro-environmental behaviour. Journal o f  Environmental Psychology, 2<*?(1), 63- 
73. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.09.004 
Reimann, M., & Bechara, A. (2010). The somatic marker framework as a neurological 
theory o f decision-making: Review, conceptual comparisons, and future 
neuroeconomics research. Journal o f  Economic Psychology, 31, 767-776. doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.002 
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1992). Status-quo and omission biases. Journal o f  Risk and 
Uncertainty, 5(1), 49-61. doi: 10.1007/bf00208786 
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal o f  
Risk and Uncertainty, 7(1), 7-59. doi: 10.1007/bf00055564 
Schweitzer, M. (1994). Disentangling status quo and omission effects: An experimental 
analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58(3), 457- 
476. doi: 10.1006/obhd. 1994.1046 
Smith, J. B., Schneider, S. H., Oppenheimer, M., Yohe, G. W., Hare, W., Mastrandrea,
M. D., . . .  van Ypersele, J.-P. (2009). Assessing dangerous climate change 
through an update o f the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
“reasons for concern”. Proceedings o f  the National Academy o f  Sciences,
106(\\), 4133-4137. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812355106
42
Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and 
choice. Journal o f  Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76-105. doi:
10.1016/0022-1031 (91 )90011 -t 
Thaler, R. H. (1980). Toward a positive theory o f consumer choice. Journal o f  Economic 
Behavior & Organization, / ( l ) ,  39-60. doi: 10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7 
Thaler, R. H. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economic 
Letters, 8, 201-207.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge : improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-458. doi: 10.1126/science.7455683 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal o f  Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323. doi: 
10.1007/bf00122574
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2011). EPA Backgrounder: Energy 
independence and security act o f 2007 (EISA). Retrieved from 
http://www.energystar.gov/ia/products/lighting/cfls/downloads/EISA_Backgroun 
der_FINAL_4-11 _EP A.pdf?21 bO-ce95 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2012, October 16). State and local 





Taxpayer funded recycling program: Your city is no longer able to fully fund a program 
for the proper collection and disposal o f  recyclable products (plastic bottles, mixed paper, 
aluminum cans, etc.). In order to continue the government run program, your city is 
charging a monthly fee that exclusively covers all costs associated with the operation and 
maintenance o f a residential recycling program. Each year these fees will total $35.
Green mileage fee: Automobiles are a major source of pollution and greenhouse gas 
emission. A tax is being proposed that charges a fee based on the number o f miles 
driven. This fee would be assessed at different rates based on the environmental impact 
o f the vehicle. For example, a hybrid electric vehicle would be taxed at a lower rate than 
a gasoline fueled sport utility vehicle. Based on current data, the average annual rate for 
such a tax would be $180 per year. The revenue from these fees would be used to help 
develop cleaner forms of transportation.
Energy efficient lighting: Light emitting diode (LED) light bulbs are the most energy 
efficient bulbs on the market today. LEDs produce the same amount o f light as 
incandescent and compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs, but require considerably less 
energy to do so. The increased energy efficiency means a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Virginia government is altering the federal Energy Independence and 
Security Act o f 2007 to incorporate LED technology. Under the amended Act, all
44
households would be required to exclusively use LED bulbs by year 2021. The average 
consumer would need to spend $75 annually to meet these new standards in the allotted 
time.
Storm water fees: As the name suggests, storm water refers to the water that results from 
precipitation. The water that does not soak into the ground ends up carrying many 
pollutants into the areas natural waterways. To combat this pollution and control 
flooding, the cities o f Hampton Roads have established storm water management 
systems. These systems are paid for by “storm water fees” that are charged to residents. 
Fees vary by city, but imagine that the current storm water fee for your city is $95 per 
year. This is the average yearly fee across the Hampton Roads area. City managers are 
planning an upgrade to the system that would decrease waterway pollution by an 
additional 15%. To pay for the upgrade, residents will have to pay an additional $12 per 
year.
Compost: Food scraps and lawn trimmings account for 27% of the waste in U.S. 
landfills. However, the majority o f these materials can be composted. Composting is the 
process breaking down organic material into a soil-like substance that can be used to 
strengthen soil or grow plants. The use o f compost reduces the reliance on potentially 
hazardous chemical fertilizers which runoff into natural waterways, remediates 
contaminated soil, decreases pollution created by landfills, and much more. Your city is 
planning a compost collection service. Yard trimmings and kitchen scraps would be
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collected weekly, much like a curbside recycling program. The cost o f implementing and 
maintaining such a program would cost each household $23 per year.
Carbon tax: City officials want to implement a tax based on energy usage. This program 
would affect all households that use electricity, but reduced rates would be granted to 
users of “green energy” sources such as solar or wind power. The fee (or “carbon tax”) 
would be added to each resident’s utility bill. Funds would be used by the city to develop 
eco-friendly initiatives and help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An average resident 
would pay $ 16 per year for this carbon tax.
Eco-fees: Many items that end up in landfills are not properly discarded. A product may 
not be readily recycled by the current recycling program, or hazardous materials are not 
disposed o f in a safe manner. For example, automobile tires can be recycled but they are 
not accepted by municipal curbside programs. Similarly, antifreeze that is sent to the 
landfill can seep into the soil, polluting groundwater and harming wildlife. The state 
government has proposed a program o f  Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) to fight 
these harmful effects. EPR mandates that manufacturers or importers o f  certain materials 
are responsible for setting up a recycling program to recover the waste at the end of the 
product life. For example, tire manufacturers are responsible for creating easily 
accessible programs to recycle old tires. The proposed law would initially only affect the 
manufacturers o f motor oil, antifreeze, tires, paint, and aerosol cans. Because these 
manufacturers must pay for the new recycling programs, they would presumably pass 
these costs onto the consumer. When consumers purchased one o f the designated
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products, an “eco-fee” would be added to their bill. This new law would result in the 
average consumer paying $ 1 0  more per year.
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